International historians have long been fascinated by public opinion and its influence on policymaking, citing it frequently as one of the many factors that inform foreign policy choices. However, historiansand international historians in particular -have yet to develop any substantial or rigorous methodological frameworks capable of revealing the actual influence of popular opinion at the highest levels of diplomatic policy. This article intends to redress this deficiency by outlining a methodological approach that elucidates the role of public opinion in the decision-making process. In so doing, it will also explore the tensions between different approaches to the study of international history, notably the apparent divergence between traditional 'diplomatic' history on the one hand and the more theoretically-diffuse 'international' history on the other. The conceptual framework forwarded here will suggest that the two approaches need not be in opposition, at least when seeking to explain the formative role of public opinion on foreign policymaking. Indeed, the careful application of inter-disciplinary theoretical frameworks not only enriches our understanding of international history in its totality, but also reveals much about the diplomatic fulcrum of our discipline.
embrace -diverse approaches and methodologies, there is an almost instinctive resistance to any substantial deviation from the traditional focus on decision-makers and their social environment. This is no great surprise. After all, even Patrick Finney, a staunch advocate of cultural approaches, accepts that international history will always place a heavy emphasis 'on grasping the causes of things', necessitating a focus on decision-makers and the machinery of decision-making. 17 Although international history has rightly moved beyond a uniquely state-centric approach, it is difficult to envisage a time when the study of international relations will not be dominated by issues of war and peace. It can, therefore, be argued that the seismic shifts affecting the theory and practice of the wider discipline have had only a marginal impact on international history. But such an argument only holds water at a superficial level, as recent academic developments and trends have not been without effect.
Above all, international historians are now more theoretically self-conscious, more aware of their own subjectivity, and more amenable to inter-disciplinary approaches. Indeed, this should come as no surprise; international historians have never been as impervious to external influences as its critics would suggest.
Despite this, international historians can certainly profit from embracing and developing innovative theoretical approaches capable of assisting them in 'reconstructing the decision-maker's knowledge, experience and expectations.' 18 To be sure, historians can embrace inter-disciplinary approaches without sacrificing the centrality of the decisionmaking process in their analyses. As Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte have recently suggested, the cultural turn 'adjusts the focus' away from conventional diplomatic history but it does not exclude it. 19 One area in which the two approaches can be complementary is in assessing the causal role of public opinion. On the one hand, public opinion is the object of sustained and thorough academic analysis, particularly within the social sciences. However, within the field of international history, the issue of public opinion remains relatively underdeveloped, particularly the interplay between public opinion and foreign policymaking. 20 This article suggests that engagement with more theoretical approaches to Peter Jackson, who is generally receptive to recent trends and developments, has also identified drawbacks to 'culturalist' approaches, suggesting that they need to be applied more thoughtfully and carefully to the study of international history. See Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu', 162. the study of public opinion can shed some much-needed light on the public opinion/foreign policy nexus and thus enhance our overall understanding of the decision-making process in particular and diplomatic history in general. Indeed, the remainder of this article will demonstrate both the possibilities for, and the practical benefits of, theoretical and methodological pluralism.
Theorising the public opinion-policymaking interface: The lay of the land
The reluctance of historians to tackle public opinion research is not shared by political scientists, particularly in the United States. The resultant literature is massive, and continues to grow at a rapid rate. However, the problems posed by a subject as nebulous as public opinion are apparent from the lack of an accepted definition. At a conference of American political scientists in 1924 a motion was passed asserting that because it is 'impossible to provide a standardised definition of public opinion … it is preferable, if possible, to avoid using the term.' 21 For historians interested in the influence of public opinion on the policymaking process, the lack of a workable definition is problematic. Simply put, to assess historians without recourse to such data, there is an obvious problem. As one scholar has remarked, 'the historian of opinion who builds on opinion polls may possibly be building on sand, but his foundations are certainly on a different sort of material from those of historians of earlier periods.' 23 Although a convincing and accurate definition of public opinion remains elusive, research into its influence on the policymaking process has been more fruitful. Early analyses, based on the pioneering work of Walter Lippmann and Gabriel Almond, suggested that public opinion had an injurious impact on the foreign policymaking process. Lippmann viewed public opinion as a detrimental constraint on policymakers, too often ill-informed or simply wrong, compelling 'wiser' governments to take imprudent decisions.' 24 Almond offered a similarly negative appraisal, claiming that American public opinion was largely 'indifferent' to matters of foreign affairs, characterised by media-fuelled 'moods' that serve only to distort the government's foreign and strategic policy choices. 25 Bernard C. Cohen, however, in an important and influential book examining the role of public opinion on foreign policy decision-making, offered an alternative interpretation. Whilst agreeing that illinformed mass opinion may contribute to regrettable policy decisions, he argued that, in reality, decision-makers largely ignore it. Indeed, the most frequently-cited sentence from Cohen's book is where he quotes an American State Department official: 'To hell with public opinion … We should lead and not follow.' 26 Moreover, in an earlier piece, Cohen suggested that tracing the influence of public opinion on foreign policy, especially in an era pre-dating opinion polls, was futile. For Cohen, little confidence could be placed in historical assessments of 'an earlier period that are based, unavoidably, on a selective reading of the press or on the accounts of one or at most a few observers or participants.' 27 Hence a new consensus held that public opinion, at least with regard to foreign policymaking, was of negligible importance. However, the terrain shifted again during and after the Vietnam War. Studies emerged demonstrating that American public opinion, rather than being fickle and subject to changing 'moods', was relatively stable, and had been throughout the Cold War era. Moreover, it wielded a genuine influence on foreign policy 23 An earlier historian, discussing public opinion during Disraeli's premiership, contended that 'no government that ever existed, not even the most despotic, has ever been able to shake reports) put together by Germany's security apparatus as means of gauging wider opinion. 38 Indeed, the careful monitoring of the population by authoritarian regimes can provide the historian with a meticulous record of the public spirit that is simply not afforded the historian of a democratic state. For example, an historian of Vichy France is assisted greatly by the abundant monthly reports produced by the departmental prefects, including sections assessing the 'état d'esprit' of the local populace. 39 But such sources are not always available, especially when it comes to public attitudes towards foreign policy issues. As a result, international historians are often compelled to cast their net more widely. For example, Keith Sandiford, in his exploration of British public opinion regarding the Schleswig-Holstein question, noted how the inability to gauge 'the feelings of the silent majority' leaves historians of the mid-Victorian era little option but to focus upon the elites, whose diaries, personal papers and correspondence provides some evidence of comment and opinion. 40 But focussing on social and political elites is not necessarily a bad thing. For international historians in particular, such an approach is the most accurate way of re-creating how public opinion was perceived in decision-making circles. Indeed, the historian's task is to recreate, as accurately as possible, the social environment in which contemporary policymakers arrived at their understanding of popular opinion. In short, it is necessary to identify which sources were capable of informing the perceptions of public opinion held in the corridors of power. For example, Yvon Lacaze's massive study of French public opinion during the 1938 Sudeten crisis focuses on the government, parliament, political parties, newspapers, and specific social groups (such as freemasons, business leaders and farmers) in an effort to paint an overall portrait of French opinion. 41 However, despite using a plethora of sources, Lacaze relied most heavily on the popular press. In so doing he reflected the proclivity of historians to use newspapers as an indicator of public sentiment. As Lothar Reinermann notes, in the absence of opinion polls it is inevitable that historians will turn to the press. But the focus on newspapers is not only a matter of expediency; as Laura Beers remarks, newspapers had, by the interwar period, 38 Of course, historians do recognise the limitations of such an approach, but, without opinion poll or other survey data to work with, they see little alternative. As Brett Holman concludes, using the press to gauge opinion might be an imperfect approach but it is the 'best we have.' 43 Furthermore, it is worth noting that many politicians and diplomats themselves believed that the press was an accurate and reliable conduit of the popular mood. Indeed, France's ambassador to London during the 1930s, Charles Corbin, was only prepared to accept the findings of the fledgling British Institute of Public Opinion when they corresponded with the 'permanent barometer of opinion' that was the press. 44 To be sure, there is a correlation between the emergence of a mass circulation press and a growing political sensitivity to the phenomena of public opinion. For the British diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson, the emergence of a 'new' diplomacy in the early twentieth-century was attributable, at least in part, to both 'an increasing appreciation of the importance of public opinion', and a 'rapid increase in communications.' 45 Nevertheless, the influence that subsequent perceptions of opinion had on the policy-making process is debatable. Paul Kennedy acknowledges that it was a factor in decision-making, but warns against assuming that 'statesmen and permanent officials became the helpless puppets of the press.' 46 But simply by acknowledging the press as a factor, Kennedy, like the vast majority of international historians, would concur with Dominik Geppert's assertion that newspapers should not be seen 'as an external factor in political actions, but as a constitutive element within the political culture that produces and conditions political decisions in the first place. providing objective and indisputable facts? Obviously, recent academic trends have gone a long way towards rendering such a question redundant. It is now widely accepted that the natural sciences are just as vulnerable to subjective interpretation as history or the social sciences. 50 In sum, if one accepts that scientific 'facts' can never be entirely independent of theory, perhaps it is necessary, with regard to the historical study of public opinion, to resist the temptation to fetishise opinion poll data. Despite their 'scientific' nature, they too are subject to interpretation, inevitably tainted by an individual's subjective ideological beliefs.
Indeed, opinion polls are not without their critics. Pierre Bourdieu famously declared that 'public opinion does not exist', claiming that opinion polls, by their very nature, act to shape rather than reflect opinion. 51 14 polls or surveys.' Despite this, Herbst encourages 'historians of public opinion [to] try to piece together past connotations of "public opinion" by evaluating memoirs, newspapers, civic texts, and other cultural artefacts'. Although the available archival sources 'may be hard to find', and even then prove 'incomplete or of dubious veracity', Herbst is adamant that such an endeavour is not only possible but essential if historians are to reveal the genuine influence of public opinion. 56 The sources available are obviously context-specific, but focusing on expressions of public opinion that permeated the corridors of power will highlight the most pertinent. The documentary record can reveal which expressions of opinion reverberated most emphatically in policymaking circles, and thus entered the consciousness of the decision-makers themselves. As Floyd Allport asserted in the very first edition of the journal Public Opinion Quarterly, 'There can be no such thing as opinion without stating the content of the opinion in language form.' 57 Opinions that were not stated or expressed in such a way, or were unable to reach the decision-makers, can be disregarded. To be sure, such a narrow conception of public opinion is problematic, but the reasons for taking such an approach can be explained by referring to Habermas' seminal theories regarding the 'public sphere', theories that have informed numerous historical analyses of popular opinion. 58 For Habermas, it was only with the emergence of an educated bourgeois class in eighteenth-century Europe that an 'articulated' public opinion came into being. 59 Although Habermas' 'public sphere' has been Just as this was a problem for contemporary decision-makers, so too is it a problem for historians looking back, who are tasked with identifying correctly which expressions of opinion permeated the consciousness of the politicians and thus genuinely influenced the policymaking process. This is no easy endeavour, even if the existence of an influential minority -or what Gladstone referred to as a 'the upper ten thousand' -has long been accepted. 62 Nevertheless, a methodological approach based on 'representations' and 'perceptions' can elucidate more effectively how politicians and diplomats understood and responded to public opinion. Borrowing heavily from the work of Pierre Laborie, in conjunction with research from the discipline of social psychology, it will be argued that the political impact of public opinion can be comprehended only inasmuch as public opinion was perceived by the decision-making elites, and that these perceptions can best be understood via a notion of representations. 63 In short, the intangible phenomena of public opinion was only understood (and thus perceived) within the corridors of power by virtue of how it was represented to them. A conceptual framework of 'representations' can be used to identify the perceptions of public opinion that influenced the decision-making elites and thus contributed towards foreign policy choices.
An alternative methodology: 'Representations' and elite 'perceptions' of public opinion
Pierre Laborie has written extensively on Vichy-era France, using 'representations' as a tool for recreating contemporary French public opinion. Laborie contends that a concept of representations enables the historian to locate, amongst the plethora of divergent expressions of public opinion, how specific 'dominant' tendencies emerge. These 'dominant' tendencies, he suggests, provide 'a common notion of opinion', akin to a shared perception of what opinion actually is. Given that public opinion is not homogenous, such 'common notions' are crucial in explaining how it was reduced to a manageable number of assumptions, beliefs and perceptions. Moreover, when attempting to explain how public opinion influenced the policymaking process, identifying shared perceptions enables the historian to 'define the historical status of the phenomena of opinion, and its place in the explanatory process.' 64 Representations are thus used as a methodological tool for locating what historians have always assumed to exist: dominant tendencies of public opinion. Indeed, it has long been accepted that it is misleading to speak of 'public opinion' in the singular. As René composite reactions of the general public, but as a rule, the only tangible evidence of these tendencies is to be found in the opinions of the more influential leaders.' 67 At first glance, therefore, a notion of 'representations' would appear to offer little more than a means of ascertaining the dominant tendencies of opinion, something that historians have always tried to do. However, this technique provides a more nuanced appreciation of how these dominant tendencies of opinion emerge, which is not always readily apparent from the documentary record alone. As Laborie remarks, the absence of observable expressions of opinion does mean there is no opinion at all. Furthermore, he suggests that 'the silences, the un-said, the inertia and the pauses' are not insignificant; on the contrary, they provide the historian with 'many revelations, charged with meaning.' 68 Therefore, the tool of representations not only advances our understanding of how dominant tendencies of opinion emerge but also reveals how other tendencies are marginalised or even concealed altogether. In essence, it is not necessarily the 'opinion' itself that is (or becomes) dominant; instead, the dominance of any given 'opinion' arises from the very process of its representation, benefitting by being represented volubly, repeatedly, or merely in the right places at the right times. The extent to which public opinion wielded a genuine influence on the policymaking process can only be understood if one locates, within the plethora of 'public opinions', which specific tendencies permeated the consciousness of the political elites. The only 'public opinion' that influenced policy was that which was recognised and understood in the corridors of power, as perceived via a process of social representations.
At this juncture, it is prudent to elaborate further on the understanding of the term 'representation' as used in this essay. Borrowing heavily from the work of French historians and French social psychologists, it is predicated upon the représentations sociales outlined by Serge Moscovici, who himself was influenced heavily by Durkheim's conception of 'collective representations'. 69 The process of representation, therefore, refers to both the act of public opinion being 'represented', and the manner in which individuals and collective groups (e.g. policymakers) internalise and make sense of these representations. It is this latter phenomenon, for which there is little empirical or 'hard' proof, that sits so uncomfortably with theory-averse historians, and which benefits most from engaging with 67 Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 4-5. 68 Laborie, 'De l'opinion publique à l'imaginaire social', 104. imaginaire sociale -that events become defined and understood: 'Without them, we could not interpret the world meaningfully at all.' 73 Hall goes on to define three broad theories of representation: the reflective approach, in which language as a representation acts as a mirror, reflecting a true meaning that already exists; the intentional approach, which contends that it is the actor who imposes his own meaning on the world through language; and finally, a constructivist approach, which holds that 'things don't mean: we construct meaning, using representational systems -concepts and signs.' Of the constructivist approach, Hall observes that social actors 'use the conceptual systems of their culture and the linguistic and other representational systems to construct meaning, to make the world meaningful and to communicate about that world meaningfully to others.' 74 It is a constructivist approach that lends itself to an analysis of public opinion via a conceptual notion of representations; public opinion only becomes 'meaningful' by virtue of how it is 'represented' and 'perceived'. In essence, one arrives at what John Durham Peters has termed the 'imagined public' which, crucially, is not imaginary at all: once these representations are perceived and acted upon, 'the public can come to exist as a real actor.' 75 The task for the historian is to locate, recreate, and analyse these representations.
In order to do so, this article posits that two distinct categories of representation be used: 'residual' representations and 'reactive' representations. Residual representations of public opinion are those that decision-makers refer to instinctively and intuitively; the accepted tendencies of opinion that are taken as a 'given', without any need for verification.
When Holsti notes that 'decision-makers quietly anticipate public opinion without consciously doing so', he refers to anticipations constructed via residual representations that are established firmly within their cognitive maps. 76 Although such representations need not be an accurate reflection of opinion (which might have subsequently evolved), they can retain an unrepresentative dominance and influence, potentially distorting the perceptions of public opinion held by policymakers. Indeed, Moscovici notes that representations 'are historical in their essence', emanating from people's experiences of the past. 77 All members of a society (including policymakers) are exposed to its dominant narratives and share many of the experiences that shape a national consciousness. Two to the detriment of Russia. 85 Clearly, the old Soviet narrative lingered even beyond the end of the Cold War. Dominant narratives need not, however, be state-sanctioned. For example, the perception that interwar French society was profoundly pacifist was widespread, and it too was propagated in the classroom. 86 Moreover, this particular narrative provided a potent residual representation of French opinion that not only informed many contemporary French decision-makers but was often shared by them, their pacifism borne out of the bitter memories of the Great War. This perception of a pacifist-infused society was difficult to shake, and almost certainly influenced French foreign and defence policy throughout this period. 87 In a sense, this 'residual' representation of French pacifism became analogous to Caroline Howarth's description of 'hegemonic' social representations, which 'pervade the dominant social construction of reality.' Of course, if public opinion evolves, or even alters fundamentally, such representations cannot retain their hegemony indefinitely. As Howarth notes, they are contested by 'oppositional representations.' 88 In the methodological approach being suggested here, these can be labelled 'reactive representations' (as they need not be 'oppositional').
'Reactive' representations are the way in which public opinion is represented in the 'here and now', reflecting the ebbs and flows of opinion on any given issue and at any given time. The sources of such representations will naturally vary depending on the context, but can include opinion polls, newspaper commentary, television, radio or internet content, contemporary police reports, official and personal correspondence and conversation, even idle gossip and rumour. In essence, 'reactive' representations echo what Allport labelled the 'more recent content' of opinion, reflecting its evolution in response to 'a new stimulus' (namely contemporary events). 89 The historian must identify which 'reactive' representations permeated the consciousness of the decision-makers and thus shaped their perception of opinion. Although such an approach can be criticised for examining 'elite' rather than 'mass' opinion, it is vindicated when the stated aim is to recreate the 'perceptions' of opinion held in policymaking circles. The accuracy of these perceptions is less important than their ability to inform policy decisions.
The historian must also, therefore, analyse the interplay between 'reactive' and 'residual' representations. To trace how perceptions of public opinion altered over time, it is necessary to examine the ability of 'hegemonic' residual representations to withstand the challenge of reactive representations (especially when the latter were 'oppositional').
Here it is worth noting Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann's influential 'spiral of silence' theory, which suggested that the public are unlikely to express any opinion that they perceive to be contrary to the prevailing sentiment. 90 Therefore, 'reactive' representations may often reinforce the predominant 'residuals' simply because the latter are so potent that nobody is prepared to risk social exclusion by challenging them publicly. Moreover, it is also This latter concern, although of crucial importance when seeking to establish what public opinion actually was, is less troublesome when the focus is on elite perceptions of opinion. After all, decision-makers' attempts to manipulate opinion can reveal much about their perceptions of it in the first place. Furthermore, 'residual' representations provide the historian with a methodological tool for identifying some of the 'unspoken assumptions' that shaped an individual's 'mental map'. And, as James Joll has told us, 'one of the limitations of the documentary evidence is that few people bother to write down, especially in moments of crisis, things they take for granted.' 93 Similarly, Pierre
Renouvin noted more than forty years ago that certain influential opinions 'did not leave a paper trail' meaning that, 'in the analysis of opinion, there is always something that remains elusive.' 94 However, evidence need not be as elusive as Renouvin believed, and international historians must not shy away from trawling the archival record for appropriate evidence. Other, more diverse sources (including newspapers, popular literature, cinema, diaries, even traces of gossip and rumour, etc.), can be used to recreate the wider social and cultural environment in which perceptions of public opinion were constructed. A more sophisticated understanding and awareness of these perceptions allows the historian to speculate more confidently about the actual influence wielded by public opinion. Moreover, this approach need not be confined to the influence of public opinion in a single country. How policymakers in one country perceived public opinion in another is also revealed through a study of representations, demonstrating how one country's public opinion could inform the foreign policy of another. 95 However, even utilising a plurality of sources cannot prevent our understanding of public opinion from being imperfect. There will always be gaps and absences, certain constituencies of opinion that are marginalised and silenced. Similarly, the fragmentary nature of any documentary record, coupled with the fact that certain perceptions of public opinion were frequently unspoken, means that the empirical paper trail will almost always be incomplete, leaving the historian little alternative but to make educated assumptions and forward cautious speculation. But none of this should be a deterrent.
